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Postponement and recuperation in cohort marriage:  
The experience of South Korea 
Sam Hyun Yoo1 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Despite continuing marriage delay in East Asia, little is known about the shift of marriage 
towards later ages and the concomitant decline in marriage.  
 
OBJECTIVE 
Applying the concept of cohort postponement and recuperation to marriage in South Korea, 
I study the pattern of marriage delay among women and the extent to which delayed 
marriages are realized later in life.  
 
METHODS 
With Korean census 1% samples microdata, I compare women’s marriage schedules across 
five-year birth cohorts born between 1916 and 1985 and analyze the trend in marriage delay 
and subsequent recovery at higher ages.  
 
RESULTS 
Two distinct patterns of marriage delay can be identified. The first one occurred among the 
birth cohorts born in the 1930s and early 1940s, who faced successive political upheavals 
such as World War II and the Korean War. A different pattern of marriage delay is 
underway among the women born since the 1970s, among whom the proportion of the 
never-married by age 45 has begun to increase. These two patterns changed with level of 
education: The wars delayed marriage in a similar way for all social groups, whereas the 
recent marriage delay is more pronounced among women with tertiary education.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The extent to which marriage delay is compensated at later ages differed across cohorts and 
social groups. Given the recent trend, the proportion of ever-married women by age 45 is 
expected to decline considerably among the younger cohorts born since the late 1970s, 
bringing an end to the universal marriage pattern in South Korea. 
                                                          
1 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Wittgenstein Centre, (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), Vienna, 
Austria. E-Mail: yoosam@iiasa.ac.at. 
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1. Introduction 
The age at which people marry has been increasing in most industrialized societies since 
the 1960s. In Western societies, for example, women’s mean age at first marriage has 
shifted from the early to late twenties (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008). A similar increase in 
women’s mean age at first marriage was later seen in the advanced economies of East Asia. 
Women’s singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) in this region rose from the early to late 
twenties between 1970 and 2005 (Jones and Gubhaju 2009). Despite similar trends in 
marriage delay, the pattern of union formation in East Asia remains very different from in 
Western Europe. In Western societies unmarried cohabitation has become widespread and 
people frequently choose alternative family forms, such as single-parent families, living 
apart together, and same-sex relationships. These non-traditional families, although on the 
increase, remain marginal in East Asian societies.  
East Asian societies have different histories and backgrounds and may display more 
dynamic patterns of marriage transition than Western societies. In this region, increasing 
marriage delay and, until recently, the persistence of universal marriage imply that a high 
proportion of those delaying marriage do eventually marry. This marriage ‘recuperation’ 
was even stronger in the past, given that the age at first marriage has continued rising since 
the early 20th century, whereas the share of never-married women at ages 45–49 has 
remained stable until recently (Atoh, Kandiah, and Ivanov 2004; Jones 2007; Jones and 
Gubhaju 2009). As most childbearing still occurs in marital unions, marriage delay has 
strongly contributed to very low fertility in East Asia. Despite its significance, little is 
known about the process of marriage delay and recuperation in East Asia. Many studies 
have repeatedly reported the trend towards later and fewer marriages in East Asian societies 
(Dalla Zuanna et al. 1998; Kwon 2007; Park, Lee, and Jo 2013; Raymo 2003; Raymo and 
Iwasawa 2005; Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001; Yu and Xie 2015b). However, the 
pattern of cohort postponement of marriages in the region has not yet received much 
attention, probably due to ambiguity in the definition of marriage ‘delay’ and limited data 
availability. 
This study explores the marriage postponement and recuperation (P&R) process in 
South Korea. From a cohort perspective, I define the marriage P&R process as a decline in 
marriage rates at younger ages and their compensatory rise at older ages across successive 
birth cohorts. I argue that this marriage P&R process is important for understanding 
marriage transitions across time and space. In response to broad social change, people often 
take ways that involve the least institutional organization and the least cost, such as the 
postponement of marriage (Davis and Blake 1956:235). In this sense, changes in marriage 
timing constitute an efficient way of adapting to dynamic social and economic changes 
while maintaining conventional value systems and customs. However, marriage 
postponement often leads to a decline in the proportion of women who have ever married 
by the end of their reproductive span. This incomplete recuperation might not be foreseen, 
but might rather reflect unforeseen circumstances that unfold later in life, changing 
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preferences among women and men who have got used to a single lifestyle, and slow 
adaptation to changing circumstances and conditions. A time lag between marriage 
postponement at younger ages and subsequent recuperation at older ages also contributes to 
a temporary fall in marriage rates (e.g., Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Thus, the analysis of 
marriage recuperation can determine whether the contemporary trend of marriage delay in 
East Asian societies is just a shift of marriage timing to later ages or a sign of significant 
decline in marriage rates overall. A study of the marriage P&R process can provide insight 
into how marriage has changed in East Asia. It can also shed light on the commonalities 
and differences in the demographic transition between East Asian and Western societies.  
As a case study I focus on South Korea (hereafter Korea), which has simultaneously 
experienced rapid demographic changes and massive educational expansion. I address the 
following questions. First, how much of the marriage delay has been made up later in life? 
Second, how does the marriage P&R process change in the course of the demographic 
transition and among women with different levels of education? I analyze changes in the 
marriage schedule among women born in 1916–1985. I describe the extent to which 
marriage was delayed and then subsequently ‘recuperated’ across subsequent cohorts. To 
my knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the process of marriage P&R.  
 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Deinstitutionalization of marriage  
Different perspectives have been employed to explain why people marry and what factors 
affect marriage trends. Some look at marriage as a social institution embedded in society’s 
norms and values while others look at it as an individual’s rational choice. Cherlin (2004) 
argues that during the 20th century, American marriage has gone through two distinct 
transitions. The first one is the shift from an institution to a companionship, accelerated by 
industrialization accompanying structural change in the economy. During this shift in 
meaning the spouses’ emotional satisfaction became important for marital success, while 
husbands and wives maintained a sharp division of labor (i.e., the male-breadwinner 
family). Another change is the ongoing shift to so-called individualized marriage. Women’s 
expanded education, increased economic activity, economic uncertainty, and ideational 
changes brought about a transformation in gender-role division in households, and also in 
the perception of marriage. The role of wife became more flexible, while individual 
satisfaction within marriage changed from performing gendered roles to pursuing self-
fulfillment. As other alternative forms of family become more common, marriage 
increasingly becomes an arrangement of choice rather than a necessity for the transition to 
adulthood.  
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Modernization and industrialization also changed marriage patterns in East Asian 
societies such as China, Japan, and Korea (e.g., Ji 2015; Park and Kim 1995; Raymo et al. 
2015). Until recently, the primary goal of marriage in this region was to ensure the 
continuity of family and lineage. Because in these societies marriage and childbearing were 
women’s most important obligation, unmarried women were often regarded as deviant, 
immoral, and anti-social. However, the meaning of marriage has changed from a bond of 
two families to a union between two individuals based on mutual affection, although 
parental consent is still considered customary. In the early phases of industrialization in this 
region, women’s employment concentrated on low-skilled, low-paid, and temporary jobs. 
This delayed marriage to later ages, but paradoxically often facilitated marriage by 
providing young women an opportunity to provide their own dowry and trousseau (Dixon 
1978). Initially, this contributed to the emergence of later marriage while preserving the 
universal marriage pattern of East Asian societies. It is only in the last few decades that the 
proportion of people getting married at some point in their lives has been declining. In 
contrast to Western societies, childbearing outside marriage remains rare and generally 
strongly disapproved of. Other non-traditional living arrangements, especially living single 
and unmarried cohabitation, are gradually increasing (Park and Choi 2015; Raymo 2015), 
although the spread of cohabitation is uneven between countries and is almost exclusively 
practiced by childless couples (Eun and Lee 2005; Raymo, Iwasawa, and Baumpass 2009; 
Xu, Ji, and Yu 2014; Yu and Xie 2015a). As a result of these trends, women’s mean ages at 
first marriage are now among the highest globally (Jones 2007; Jones and Gubhaju 2009). 
Given the accelerated socioeconomic change, cohabitation and other non-traditional 
families could become more visible in the near future as the transition to companionate 
marriage progresses further. 
Marriage also responds to historical events, such as war, famine, infectious disease, 
and economic recession (Hacker, Hilde, and Jones 2010; Rodgers and Thornton 1985; 
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011). The influence of historical events on marriage 
varies depending on the life stage in which people experience these events. Demographic 
responses to a short-term crisis usually involve a temporary adjustment in the timing of 
union formation or childbearing (Davis 1963; Davis and Blake 1956). For instance, the 
post-war economic boom in the United States resulted in earlier and higher rates of 
marriage than previously (Rodgers and Thornton 1985). Conversely, the recent economic 
recession has delayed childbearing without contributing much to a quantum decline in 
fertility (Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011). East Asian societies have shared some 
historical events such as World War II and the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. 
These events could have delayed first marriages to later ages, but it is not yet clear whether 
they eventually eroded the universal marriage pattern.  
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2.2. Marriage postponement and recuperation 
Timing of first marriage can change, and it varies by social status and education, even in 
societies where most marriages are arranged by parents and relatives. Formal education 
delays women’s first marriage for the required school years and also nurtures ideas and 
values that promote women’s involvement in paid work and gender equality (Blossfeld and 
Huinink 1991; Thornton, Axinn, and Teachman 1995).  
Once young adults get involved in mate selection and marriage decisions, women’s 
engagement in both education and economic activity becomes important. According to the 
economic independence hypothesis, marriage declines first among women with more 
education, because their higher earning potential reduces the gains from the ‘specialization 
and exchange’ within a household (Becker 1981). Alternatively, Oppenheimer (1988, 1997) 
argues that although educated women are more likely to delay marriage, they do not 
necessarily remain single, as they wish to marry and eventually do so later on. Having 
higher earning potential, educated women can also prolong their search for the most 
suitable partner, which may require significant time and effort, as in a job-search situation. 
In many advanced societies, women’s higher income prospects also make them more 
attractive in the marriage market.  
The spouse-search hypothesis essentially describes the process whereby marriage is 
delayed but the overall marriage rate in a population does not fall, as women eventually get 
married, at later ages. Goldstein and Kenney (2001) confirm the recuperation of delayed 
marriage among educated women: among American women between the 1954–1959 and 
1960–1964 cohorts the cumulative proportion of ever married was lower for college 
graduates than for non-graduates in their twenties, but gradually increased and was 
projected to be higher in their forties. Some studies (e.g., Dixon 1971, 1978; Goldstein and 
Kenney 2001; Oppenheimer 1997) make an important distinction between marriage delay 
and marriage forgone, but the process of marriage recuperation has not yet been explored. 
Research often looks at average timing, prevalence, or relative risk of first marriage and 
compares these with the proportion of the ever married at later ages (e.g., age 44 or 49). 
However, marriage occurs at all ages, and factors affecting marriage vary with age. A 
simple cross-sectional study of marriage prevalence or a static measure of marriage timing 
might reflect just a fragmentary aspect of the recuperation process and overlook its 
dynamics. Moreover, studies using forecasting methods (e.g., Coale and McNeil 1972; 
Goldstein and Kenney 2001) build on a deterministic assumption of the marriage schedule 
that might deviate from actual observations, in particular in a society like Korea where 
marriage timing can change rapidly or depart from a standard distribution of age at first 
marriage.  
The marriage P&R process differs with level of education. Generally, educated women 
delay marriage more than others, but whether they end up having a higher proportion of the 
ever-married varies with the context, which shapes social norms and gender structure. After 
taking into account the schooling years, the association between women’s education and 
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lifetime marriage rate is positive or insignificant in gender-egalitarian societies like Sweden 
and the United States, but appears negative in societies where gender roles are segregated, 
such as Italy and Japan (Blossfeld 1995; Kalmijn 2013; Ono 2003). Educational gradient in 
marriage can also change over time in a country. Many studies have reported that the 
negative relationship between women’s education and marriage has reversed in the United 
States (e.g., Goldstein and Kenney 2001; Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 2002; Sweeney 
2002). These findings suggest that understanding dynamic change in marriage timing 
should take into account regional contexts.  
In contemporary East Asian societies, including Korea, educated women delay 
marriage more than others (Park, Lee, and Jo 2013; Raymo 2003; Raymo and Iwasawa 
2005; Tian 2013; Woo 2012; Yu and Xie 2015b). With economic independence, educated 
women are more likely to recognize and avoid the burdens of traditional gender roles and 
duties imposed on them as a wife, mother, and daughter-in-law. Marriage postponement 
and avoidance can be a useful strategy for them to avoid the social risks associated with 
gender inequity (McDonald 2000). The tradition of hypergamy, the practice of women 
marrying men of a higher status, also makes it difficult for the most-educated women in this 
region to marry. However, the educated are also more likely to marry eventually (marriage 
recuperation) because the symbolic meaning of marriage remains strong, even among 
young cohorts (Cherlin 2004). Educated women have more resources and earning potential, 
enabling them to prolong their search for the best suitable match who has more gender-
egalitarian attitudes (Oppenheimer 1988, 1997). For instance, in Japan, where women’s 
education has been negatively associated with marriage (Raymo 2003), the relationship 
between women’s earning potential and marriage has recently changed to positive (Fukuda 
2013). In Korea the spouse-search hypothesis is also in part supported by a recent rise in the 
number of educated women marrying men from more developed countries such as Japan, 
the United States, and Canada (e.g., Kim 2010). Taken together, these findings demonstrate 
that educated women are more likely to delay and recuperate marriage than others, resulting 
in a marginal difference in marriage rates at the end of the reproductive span in this region.  
 
 
2.3 The Korean context 
In Korea early and universal marriage was a social norm from the beginning of the Joseon 
Dynasty (1392–1897), which adopted Confucianism as a ruling ideology, until the first half 
of the 20th century. During this period, marriage was considered a bond between two 
lineages that expanded and maintained the family’s socioeconomic influence, and thus most 
marriages were arranged by parents and relatives (Chang 1979). Given the high mortality 
rate in a pre-modern society, early and universal marriage also had the advantage of 
achieving marriage’s primary goal: the continuation of the family lineage through sons.  
Figure 1 illustrates trends in the mean age at first marriage for men and women in 
Korea. The timing of first marriage has increased monotonically for both men and women 
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since the first census in 1925. The SMAM was 20.2 for men and 15.9 for women in 1925, 
and the proportion of women never married by the age of 20–24 was less than 2% by the 
1930 census (Kwon 2007). It is noteworthy that at that time this was one of the youngest 
ages for first marriage and one of the highest marriage rates in the world (Hajnal 1965: 
102).  
A substantive marriage delay first appeared between 1940 and 1955, when Korea 
experienced the turbulence of World War II, the liberation in 1945, and the Korean War 
(1950–1953). During this period the SMAM increased from 21.0 to 24.6 for men and from 
17.5 to 20.5 for women. This shift is mainly attributable to massive migration and selective 
mortality caused by a series of political upheavals. The wars and subsequent unrest caused 
both men and women to delay marriage, and the unbalanced sex ratios at marriageable ages 
caused by the wars also contributed to this postponement (Lapierre-Adamcyk and Burch 
1974).  
While marriage rates declined from the 1960s to the 1990s, the mean age at first 
marriage continued to increase. Marriage was delayed first as a response to industrialization 
and urbanization, and later because of women’s increased engagement in education and 
economic activity. At the same time, young adults increasingly took from their parents the 
right to select a partner. As a result, a traditional arranged marriage determined by parents 
was gradually transformed into a form of dates arranged by a mutual acquaintance or a 
friend of both persons, which could develop into a serious relationship leading to marriage. 
According to a national survey in 1991 (Gong et al. 1992), arranged marriages completely 
determined by parents, which represented 48% of the marriage cohort before 1964, almost 
disappeared for the marriage cohort after 1990 (1.2 %).  
The Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 brought appreciable changes to the marriage 
pattern in Korea. Economic constraints further delayed marriage, and late marriage 
gradually became prevalent throughout the country (Park, Lee, and Jo 2013). Young people 
began to consider economic uncertainty when making important decisions about their 
career, marriage, and having children (Eun 2003). In the 2010 census the SMAM finally 
exceeded the age of 30 for both men and women: 33.16 for men and 30.25 for women. In 
fact, the first-marriage rate has declined greatly since the late 1990s (Kwon 2007: 231–
235). Nonetheless, the proportion of never-married women aged 45–49 was still only 3.3% 
in 2010.  
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Figure 1: Singulate mean age at first marriage for men and women, 1925–2010, 
South Korea 
 
 
Note: SMAMs for 1945 and 1955 are not available. 
Source: Kwon (2005) for 1925–2005; Statistics Korea for 2010 
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lifetime. Park and colleagues (2013) reported the most intensive marriage delay and a shift 
to non-marriage among the 1971–1980 cohort of lowest-educated women, but because of 
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either the deterministic assumption of the Hernes model (Woo 2012) or the discrete time 
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3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
This study uses 1% sample data from the 1975, 1990, 2005, and 2010 Korean censuses in 
which age at first marriage is available. The Population and Housing Census of Korea, 
conducted by Statistics Korea every five years, includes a short sample survey on 
demographics such as age, sex, education, and marital status, occasionally including age at 
first marriage. Having larger sample sizes, the data is more useful than other sources for 
estimating cohort-specific marriage schedules. From each available census, data was 
collected on women aged 30–59, including their educational attainment. Taking into 
account misreporting of the marriage age and possible selection by mortality differentials, I 
excluded responses from women aged 60 or above. I used responses from women aged 30 
and above only because most women complete their education before that age in Korea. In 
estimating lifetime singlehood, I used age 45 as an upper limit because first marriage after 
age 45 is still rare among Korean women, and because it also allows for including more 
recent cohorts in the analysis. As a result, the final analytical sample comprises 338,307 
cases. The sample size for every five-year birth cohort varies from a minimum of 4,886 to a 
maximum of 58,286 cases. 
 
 
3.2 Methods  
The concept of marriage delay is arbitrary and subjective. At the micro level, it is difficult 
to say whether an individual is delaying marriage unless their original plan and the eventual 
outcome are known and considered together. Moreover, people frequently change their 
marriage plans as they get older, but data to analyze this process is not widely available.  
Cohort analysis can be useful for resolving this kind of problem. At an aggregate level, 
the marriage schedule of one cohort can be compared to those of successive cohorts. Being 
still single at the end of the reproductive period is an outcome of successive decisions and 
behaviors that cumulate over the course of a lifetime (Ryder 1965). Comparison of 
marriage schedules between the two cohorts of interest reflects the collective differences in 
the marriage P&R process and marriage-related life trajectories. To be specific, whether or 
not the gap between successive cohorts in the cumulative first marriage rate observed at 
younger ages also persists at older ages provides evidence on whether marriages are merely 
being delayed (the gap narrows down or even closes completely with age) or forgone (the 
gap persists).  
The analysis of marriage postponement and recuperation presented in this study is 
inspired by earlier research on cohort fertility P&R patterns in Europe (Frejka 2011; Frejka 
and Calot 2001; Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010; Frejka and Sardon 2004; Lesthaeghe 
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2001; Sobotka et al. 2012). Sobotka et al. (2012) developed a method comparing the gap in 
cohort cumulative fertility rates at different ages between subsequent birth cohorts. The 
cumulative fertility in these subsequent cohorts is related to the fertility trajectory of the 
initial (benchmark) cohort.  
I use this method and apply it to the case of marriage delay. Building on prior studies 
(e.g., Frejka 2011; Sobotka et al. 2012), I investigate the marriage P&R process and 
quantify the extent of marriage delay and how much of the delay is recouped at later ages. 
In practice, marriage postponement indicates absolute (or relative) decline in the 
cumulative cohort first marriage rate (CFMR), which is equivalent to the age-specific 
proportion of ever married, when the cohort of interest is contrasted with the benchmark 
cohort. The postponement is measured at the age at which the gap in CFMR between 
cohorts is widest (the trough). Marriage recuperation at later ages is measured by absolute 
(or relative) gains in the cumulative cohort marriage rate since reaching the trough.  
The way to measure the postponement and recuperation is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Comparing two hypothetical cohorts, a and b, suppose the older cohort a is a benchmark 
cohort. Cohort a’s CFMRs for ages 13–44 are used as a baseline, which is a horizontal line 
at zero. As some women reported first marriage before the age of 15, which was not 
uncommon for Korean women born in and before the 1930s, I used 13 as the lower limit of 
the age range. For cohort b, the age-specific difference in CFMRs from the benchmark is 
depicted as a trend line. The falling curve on the left side represents an absolute decline in 
the CFMR of cohort b at younger ages compared to the benchmark (cohort a), while the 
rising curve on the right side indicates an absolute increase in CFMR at older ages 
offsetting the marriage deficit at younger ages. The decline in CFMR at younger ages is 
considered as ‘marriage postponement’ (P) and the subsequent rise in marriage rate at older 
ages is labeled ‘marriage recuperation’ (R). For the sake of convenience, I use the terms 
‘marriage postponement’ and ‘marriage delay’ interchangeably throughout this study. The 
ratio of marriage recuperation over postponement is computed at ages 30, 35, 40, and 45 as 
the recuperation index (RI= R/P*100). Three measures (P, R, and RI) are used for 
comparisons across cohorts.  
These measures can also be computed using a moving benchmark model that 
compares the cohort of interest with a moving benchmark, such as an immediate preceding 
cohort (Lesthaeghe 2001). As the essential part of the moving benchmark model is identical 
to the fixed benchmark model, other than setting a moving benchmark I do not discuss it 
further and use it only for supplementary purposes. This method provides a useful 
opportunity to quantify the marriage P&R process. 
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Figure 2: The conceptual illustration of measuring marriage postponement (P), 
recuperation (R), and recuperation index (RI) 
 
Source: Frejka (2012), Sobotka et al. (2011) 
 
 
3.3 Analytical strategy  
The analysis presented in this study consists of two parts. First, I study changes in the 
marriage P&R process across cohorts of women born between 1916 and 1980. Graphical 
illustrations of the P&R process demonstrate how marriage postponement advanced and 
also what share of presumably delayed marriage eventually became forgone marriages 
compared to previous cohorts. Second, I analyze variation in P&R trends by level of 
education. As a result of the profound educational transition in Korea it was not possible to 
use the same educational categories for all the cohorts analyzed here. Therefore I separated 
the birth cohorts into two broad groups, distinguished by their fertility levels: 1) cohorts 
born before 1960 that had above-replacement fertility and 2) cohorts born in 1960 and later, 
characterized by sub-replacement fertility. As the sample size for each cohort becomes 
smaller in education-specific trends, I use five-year birth cohorts.  
For both the older and the younger cohort groups, four different educational categories 
are distinguished and changes in marriage schedules for the corresponding level of 
education are illustrated. The oldest cohort of women (1916–1920) is chosen as the 
benchmark for the cohorts born between 1916 and 1960, which have experienced the first 
demographic transition. By contrast, the younger cohorts born since 1960 can be seen as an 
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early generation of the second demographic transition because of their experience of below-
replacement fertility and their relatively high educational attainment (Yoo 2014). For these 
cohorts I define the 1956–1960 cohort as the benchmark representing the marriage pattern 
characteristic of the final stage of the first demographic transition.  
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Trends in marriage postponement and recuperation 
Changes in women’s marriage rate by age from the 1916–1920 cohort to the 1981–1985 
cohort are illustrated in Figure 3. The upper graph represents the survival curves of never-
married women by age. Over the subsequent cohorts the marriage schedule has been 
continuously delayed in Korea. At the same time the cohort-specific trends tend to 
converge towards the bottom as women approach age 45, suggesting that a vast majority of 
women (95%–99%) eventually married. However, the younger cohorts born in and after the 
1970s began to depart from this pattern of universal marriage and show a new pattern 
characterized by later and fewer marriages.  
The lower graph in Figure 3 illustrates the marriage P&R process across five-year 
birth cohorts. The figure was transformed from the survival curves into the differences in 
CFMR by age, starting from the 1916–1920 benchmark cohort. The u-shaped curves depict 
how each cohort’s marriage schedule by age deviated from the benchmark. A descending 
slope on the left side represents a decline in CFMR at younger ages over the benchmark 
cohort, whereas an ascending slope on the right side illustrates the catching-up effect as 
delayed marriages are made up for at later ages. The u-shaped curve becomes deeper and 
wider across cohorts, signaling that marriage delay has intensified (deeper trough) while 
marriage recuperation became more protracted (signaled by widening curves) across 
cohorts. The graph also demonstrates that marriage recuperation took place especially 
among women in their late twenties and early thirties.  
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Figure 3: Change in timing of women’s first marriage between the 1916–1920 and 
1981-1985 birth cohorts 
a. survival curves of never-married women 
 
 
b. marriage postponement and recuperation 
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Figure 4 summarizes key indicators of the marriage P&R process: postponement (P), 
recuperation (R), recuperation index (RI), and a decline in CMFR at age 45. The upper 
graph (a) is derived from the baseline cohort model, which used a fixed benchmark (cohort 
1916–1920), while the lower graph (b) is based on a moving benchmark model. All these 
measures are documented in Appendices A and B.  
Marriage postponement (absolute decline in CFMR at the trough age) gradually 
increased across cohorts, accelerating especially among the women born in the 1930s and 
1940s. The absolute value of marriage postponement (P) reaches 0.871 at age 23 for the 
youngest cohort, 1981–1985, representing a decline in the share of women married by that 
age of 87%. This indicates that marriage at age 22 shifted from being almost universal to 
becoming rare. The bar plots represent absolute recuperation (R) in CFMR from the trough 
by selected ages (30, 35, and 45), showing the share of delayed marriages that were 
recuperated by these ages. The recuperation index showed a nearly complete recuperation 
effect in marriage rate until the 1956–1960 cohort, but began to depart from this complete 
recuperation from the 1961–1965 cohort onward. As a result, the recuperation index at age 
45 stays around 94%‒96% for the women born in the 1960s in the fixed benchmark model, 
but declined to around 85-85% in the moving benchmark model (see Table 1). However, 
the trend in recuperation at younger ages among the women born in the 1970s has clearly 
weakened. The proportion of women remaining never-married at age 35 was 9% among the 
1965–1970 cohort, but rose to 14% and 19% for the 1971–1975 and 1976–1980 cohorts 
respectively, signaling a likely rise of permanent non-marriage.  
In sum, marriage delay in Korea continued throughout all the cohorts observed in this 
study. Two qualitatively different shifts in marriage timing can be distinguished. The first 
major shift towards delayed marriage took place among women born in the 1930s and the 
early 1940s. For them, the marriage postponement was remarkable, but women never 
marrying by age 45 remained rare due to the almost complete recuperation of delayed 
marriages at later ages. The most common age at first marriage for women became their 
early twenties. The second major transformation in marriage timing coincided with the 
emergence of below-replacement fertility among the women born since the 1960s. 
Marriage postponement gradually intensified, while recuperation began to slow down. This 
new divergence between marriage postponement and recuperation resulted in a rise in 
permanent non-marriage, manifested especially among the women born in the 1970s. 
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Table 1: Women’s marriage postponement and recuperation by birth cohort, 
1916–1920 to 1976–1980 cohorts 
Birth cohort Postponement (P) Age  
at trough 
 Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = R/P) 
 30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
 a. fixed benchmark model, compared to the 1916-1920 cohort 
c1916-1920 0.000 0  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 0.068 18  0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069  1.015 1.009 1.007 1.005 
c1926-1930 0.102 19  0.099 0.101 0.102 0.102  0.979 0.999 1.006 1.002 
c1931-1935 0.341 20  0.337 0.341 0.341 0.340  0.989 0.999 1.000 0.997 
c1936-1940 0.504 20  0.493 0.502 0.503 0.502  0.979 0.997 0.999 0.997 
c1941-1945 0.607 20  0.590 0.603 0.604 0.603  0.971 0.994 0.995 0.994 
c1946-1950 0.652 21  0.609 0.635 0.640 0.642  0.935 0.975 0.983 0.985 
c1951-1955 0.665 21  0.612 0.638 0.645 0.648  0.921 0.959 0.969 0.974 
c1956-1960 0.718 21  0.639 0.681 0.692 0.696  0.890 0.948 0.964 0.969 
c1961-1965 0.734 21  0.632 0.677 0.696 0.704  0.860 0.921 0.948 0.958 
c1966-1970 0.787 21  0.633 0.703 0.730 0.741  0.804 0.893 0.928 0.942 
c1971-1975 0.812 22  0.574 0.678 0.722   0.706 0.835 0.889  
c1976-1980 0.840 22  0.463 0.648    0.551 0.772   
C1981-1985 0.871 23  0.409     0.470    
 b. moving benchmark model, compared to the immediate preceding five-year cohort  
c1916-1920 0.000 0  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 0.068 18  0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069  1.015 1.009 1.007 1.005 
c1926-1930 0.046 21  0.043 0.045 0.046 0.046  0.931 0.985 1.001 0.996 
c1931-1935 0.243 20  0.241 0.243 0.242 0.242  0.993 0.999 0.997 0.995 
c1936-1940 0.169 21  0.163 0.168 0.169 0.169  0.962 0.994 0.999 0.996 
c1941-1945 0.161 22  0.154 0.159 0.159 0.159  0.956 0.985 0.984 0.988 
c1946-1950 0.059 22  0.034 0.046 0.050 0.053  0.574 0.783 0.855 0.893 
c1951-1955 0.033 24  0.023 0.022 0.024 0.026  0.698 0.679 0.725 0.785 
c1956-1960 0.073 23  0.047 0.063 0.068 0.068  0.638 0.858 0.923 0.928 
c1961-1965 0.057 24  0.033 0.037 0.045 0.048  0.583 0.644 0.791 0.851 
c1966-1970 0.104 25  0.052 0.077 0.085 0.089  0.506 0.745 0.820 0.855 
c1971-1975 0.125 27  0.041 0.076 0.092   0.326 0.602 0.732  
c1976-1980 0.181 28  0.042 0.123    0.235 0.681   
C1981-1985 0.102 27  0.017     0.166    
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Figure 4: Graphical summary of marriage postponement and recuperation,  
1916–1920 to 1976–1980 birth cohorts 
a. fixed benchmark model 
 
 
b. moving benchmark model 
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4.2 Marriage postponement and recuperation by level of education 
The pattern of marriage P&R can be further studied by level of education. This analysis 
was conducted separately for the women born before and after 1960 in order to distinguish 
the changes in marriage between the classic demographic transition and the below-
replacement fertility period (which is also referred to as the second demographic transition) 
in Korea. This division also takes into account the massive educational expansion in Korea 
and its effect on the different education categories used in the analysis. 
Figure 5 illustrates the marriage P&R process for the older cohorts of women born 
between 1916 and 1960. I use four different education categories: ‘incomplete primary,’ 
‘primary completion,’ ‘incomplete secondary,’ and ‘secondary completion or higher.’ 
However, only a few women among the older cohorts born before 1930 entered secondary 
education. Therefore, I merged the two education categories ‘incomplete secondary’ and 
‘secondary completion or higher’ in the benchmark cohort of 1916–1920 and set them as a 
joint benchmark for studying subsequent trends in both corresponding groups of women.  
Overall, the pattern of the marriage P&R process looks similar for the different 
education groups. From older cohorts to younger cohorts, the marriage schedule is 
progressively delayed in the late teen years, and this delay is made up for in their early 
twenties. The extent of marriage delay was most salient among the cohorts born in the 
1930s across all education groups. Thereafter the trend of marriage delay slowed down, and 
marriage timing generally stabilized across all education groups among the women born in 
the 1940s and 1950s. On the whole, the marriage P&R pattern did not differ much by level 
of education during the first demographic transition.  
Figure 5 also shows that among the least educated the 1956–1960 cohort displays 
more intensive marriage postponement with less recuperation, which contrasts with other 
education groups. As free compulsory primary education became universal and secondary 
education spread through the country, the number of women with incomplete primary 
education became marginal. The slower recuperation of their marriage rate might reflect 
their difficulty finding an appropriate partner. For the most educated the marriage schedules 
overlapped among the cohorts born in 1936–1960. Across all education groups the troughs, 
when the falls in cumulative marriage rates were most pronounced, eventually converged to 
the ages 21–22.  
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Figure 5: Marriage delay and recuperation by level of education, 1916–1920  
to 1956–1960 birth cohorts 
 
Note: As a result of small sample size, the older cohorts born before 1930 for the two highest educational groups (‘incomplete secondary’ 
and ‘secondary completion or more’) were integrated into the benchmark (the 1916-1920 cohort) for the corresponding categories.  
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Overall, the four education groups share the general pattern of the marriage P&R 
process. The younger cohorts tend to delay marriage to ever later ages, and the majority of 
delayed marriages are then recuperated later. However, in contrast to the older cohorts born 
before 1960, the recuperation is slower and incomplete. In addition, there are substantial 
differences in the intensity of marriage postponement across the four education groups.  
Among women with incomplete secondary education a reversal of marriage delay took 
place among the youngest cohort analyzed, 1981–1985, suggesting a move towards an 
earlier marriage schedule. Since the share of this group is below 5% of the cohort, this had 
almost no impact on the overall marriage trend among the whole population. It is unclear 
whether this peculiar trend towards earlier marriage in this group is likely to continue 
further. Other educational groups share a continuing retreat from marriage at younger ages, 
which progresses at a different pace. The marriage P&R curve becomes ever deeper and 
wider across cohorts. The trough age moved from the mid-twenties for the 1961–1965 
cohort towards the late-twenties for the 1966–1970 cohort for all levels of education except 
for the least educated. The deeper troughs go hand in hand with a slowing pace of marriage 
recuperation, which is moving to later ages and becoming less complete. This protracted 
recuperation of delayed marriage increasingly results in lifetime singlehood.  
The strength and the pace of the P&R process, however, differed by education. The 
postponement index (P) was positively associated with level of education except for the 
least educated (see Appendix C). The recuperation index (RI) also varied according to level 
of education. Women with tertiary education displayed slightly stronger marriage 
recuperation than other groups, but this was not strong enough to offset the differences in 
the intensity of marriage declines at younger ages.  
Yoo: Postponement and recuperation in cohort marriage in South Korea 
1064 http://www.demographic-research.org 
Figure 6: Marriage delay and recuperation by level of education, 1956–1960  
to 1981–1985 birth cohorts 
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incomplete secondary education. The slowing-down of marriage recuperation at ages 35 
and 39 and its variation by level of education among the women born in the 1970s suggest 
that more dramatic changes in marriage could emerge in the near future.  
 
Figure 7: Proportion of never-married women at ages 35 and 39 by level of 
education, 1956–1960 to 1981–1985 birth cohorts 
a. proportion of never-married women at age 35 
 
b. proportion of never-married women at age 35 
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To get further insight into the scale of the declining recuperation of postponed 
marriages and the rising permanent singlehood by level of education, I developed two 
projection scenarios of CFMR at age 45 for the women born in 1981–1985 who have 
already moved beyond the trough age in the analysis presented above. I based my 
projections on the three key P&R measures analyzed here (see Appendix Tables A-3 and 
A-4). For the two scenarios, I extrapolated a) recent trends and simply fixed b) the more 
recent levels of P&R indexes. The projected trends (results not shown here; available upon 
request) suggest that lifetime marriage is declining rapidly in Korea among the women born 
between 1971 and 1985. For instance, lifetime singlehood by age 45, which stayed below 
5% among the cohorts born up until the 1960s, was projected to reach 15%–29% among the 
women born in 1981–1985 according to the two scenarios. The four education groups share 
clear downward trends in marriage, but two groups with tertiary education stand out in their 
intensity. For instance, one-third (33%) of women born in 1981–1985 with a bachelors 
degree or higher are expected to remain permanently single, suggesting marriage will be far 
from universal if the current trend in the marriage P&R process continues. Given the rapid 
transition towards very high rates of tertiary education in Korea, the marriage trends among 
these women have a dominant and growing impact on the overall marriage patterns among 
all women. Applying a projection method based on education-specific trends can therefore 
provide a more accurate projection of cohort marriage changes in the whole society.  
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
Marriage delay has continued throughout the demographic transition in Korea. Two distinct 
shifts towards delayed marriage can be identified. The first major delay appeared among 
women born in the 1930s and early 1940s, who experienced a strong fall in marriages in 
their late teens and early twenties. This marriage delay was almost completely recouped at 
later ages during the post-Korean-war period, without a change in levels of permanent 
singlehood. A second wave of marriage delay took place among the women born from the 
early 1960s, who experienced a fall in completed fertility towards and then below 
replacement level. The extent of marriage delay increased, while among the women born in 
the 1970s and early 1980s marriage recuperation later in life became protracted and 
eventually declined. As a result, the proportion of women reaching the end of their 
reproductive lifespan without ever having been married is now projected to rise rapidly.  
Educational variation also distinguishes the ongoing marriage postponement shift from 
the previous one. Marriage postponement is now most pronounced among women with 
tertiary education, whereas in the first wave all education groups shared a general pattern of 
marriage P&R process. Women with tertiary education are associated with both a stronger 
marriage delay at younger ages and an intensive recuperation at later ages, but their 
recuperation is not enough to cover up the marriage delay at earlier ages. Thus, those with 
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tertiary education are expected to show the fastest rise in the proportion that never marry. A 
reversal of marriage delay also appeared among the women born in the early 1980s with 
incomplete secondary education, but because of the small number of women in this 
category its impact on the overall trend is negligible. When such educational disparities in 
P&R trends are taken into account, the proportion of women who have never married by 
age 45 is expected to reach 15%–29% among the latest cohort, born in 1981–1985.  
The two distinct waves of marriage delay have different causes. The first wave is 
probably due to the political turbulence of the 1940s and 1950s: World War II, liberation, 
and the Korean War. The wars and the social unrest encouraged women born in the 1930s 
and early 1940s to delay first marriage. The unbalanced sex ratio at primary marriage age 
caused by wars could have contributed to this delay (Hacker, Hilde, and Jones 2010). These 
historical events strongly influenced the marriage pattern for all social groups, and as a 
result there was little difference in the marriage P&R process by level of education. The 
shift to universal primary education in the late 1950s and the gradual collapse of traditional 
arranged marriages (Gong et al. 1992) could also have contributed to the similarity of the 
marriage P&P process across groups.  
By contrast, the major delay in marriage among the more recent cohorts involves the 
gradual differentiation of marriage behavior by social group. The trend towards later and 
fewer marriages is most pronounced in younger cohorts and among highly educated 
women, which is consistent with prior studies (Park, Lee, and Jo 2013; Woo 2012). The 
factors that caused low birth rates, such as extended education,  women’s increasing social 
participation, and economic uncertainty, could also be influencing when women marry. The 
cohorts born in and after 1960 benefited most from the expansion of higher education and 
grew up with greater economic prosperity than the previous cohorts. As they have more 
education and economic opportunities, women with higher education can delay marriage to 
avoid the heavy burden of traditional gender roles, such as childcare and housework, which 
might accompany marriage (Kim 2005). Economic uncertainty, which has spread rapidly 
since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998, could also be contributing to marriage delay 
(Eun 2007). The cohorts marrying during this crisis and afterwards are also the first cohorts 
to experience higher rates of permanent singlehood, heralding the end of universal marriage 
in Korea.  
The findings in this study also shed light on the historical pattern of marriage delay in 
East Asia and its contrast with the West. The first wave of marriage delay in Korea among 
women in the 1930s–1940s constituted a shift away from teenage marriages, but did not 
affect the underlying universality of marriage. At the same time, many Western countries 
were experiencing a shift towards earlier and more frequent marriages, concomitant with 
the post-WWII baby boom era. By contrast, the second wave of marriage delay has two 
main features that are broadly shared with western societies: a shift towards later marriage 
(with first marriages often peaking among women in their late 20s and early 30s) and, 
among the younger cohorts, a move away from getting married at all, especially among the 
highly educated. Where Korea and East Asian countries differ from the western world, 
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however, is in the extent to which cohabitation and other, less traditional living 
arrangements substitute for the decline in marriages. In most western countries, 
cohabitation has become widely accepted and childbearing outside marriage has risen 
rapidly, with some countries registering more than half of births outside marriage. In this 
respect, Korea and East Asia in general remain distinct, as childbearing outside marriage is 
not accepted by society and cohabitation is spreading only slowly, and by and large only 
among childless people. The move away from marriage in Korea may therefore also have 
strong consequences for birth rates in the country as the rising share of never-married 
women remain childless. 
This study has several limitations. The measure of marriage postponement is 
influenced by the choice of the benchmark cohort in the benchmark cohort model. A 
different benchmark might lead to different trends in marriage delay, although it should not 
alter the overall results of this study. Because of data limitations I was not able to 
investigate changes in union formation other than marriage and could not shed light on the 
role of cohabitation in Korea. Additionally, I did not consider men’s marriages in this 
study. Given the tradition of hypergamy and the positive association between men’s 
education and marriage, the least-educated men are more likely to delay marriage, and their 
delayed marriages are less likely to be made up at higher ages.  
Both the impending collapse of universal marriage and the greater variation in 
marriage across social groups are likely to intensify in the coming decades. This is likely to 
contribute to the greater acceptance of cohabitation and possibly also of non-marital 
childbearing in Korea and East Asia in general. It is too early to tell, however, whether 
highly educated women, who are most likely to remain unmarried, will be those pioneering 
the spread of non-traditional family forms in the region, or whether these will spread fastest 
among less-educated women, as was the case in some countries in Western Europe and the 
United States. 
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Appendix A 
Table A-1: Marriage P&R process by level of education, 1916–1920 to 1956–1960 
birth cohorts, fixed benchmark model 
Birth cohort Postpo
nement 
(P) 
Age  
at 
trough 
Recuperation (R) at age Recuperation Index (RI = R/P) 
30 35 40 45 30 35 40 45 
Incomplete primary           
c1916–1920 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
c1921–1925 –0.049 18 0.048 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.980 0.994 1.017 1.026 
c1926–1930 –0.058 21 0.055 0.056 0.059 0.058 0.944 0.975 1.011 1.005 
c1931–1935 –0.256 19 0.252 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.984 0.997 0.999 0.998 
c1936–1940 –0.397 19 0.391 0.394 0.396 0.394 0.984 0.992 0.997 0.993 
c1941–1945 –0.463 20 0.447 0.456 0.457 0.457 0.964 0.983 0.986 0.986 
c1946–1950 –0.469 20 0.429 0.449 0.457 0.457 0.915 0.958 0.974 0.974 
c1951–1955 –0.487 20 0.431 0.449 0.454 0.461 0.885 0.921 0.933 0.947 
c1956–1960 –0.545 22 0.437 0.461 0.478 0.487 0.802 0.846 0.877 0.894 
Primary completion           
c1916–1920 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
c1921–1925 –0.057 19 0.064 0.060 0.057 0.057 1.117 1.047 0.995 0.995 
c1926–1930 –0.066 21 0.070 0.069 0.066 0.067 1.059 1.050 1.000 1.018 
c1931–1935 –0.288 20 0.293 0.290 0.288 0.288 1.017 1.008 1.000 1.001 
c1936–1940 –0.432 20 0.432 0.433 0.432 0.432 0.998 1.003 0.998 1.000 
c1941–1945 –0.514 20 0.512 0.514 0.513 0.514 0.997 1.001 0.998 1.000 
c1946–1950 –0.518 21 0.503 0.511 0.512 0.515 0.970 0.985 0.988 0.994 
c1951–1955 –0.502 21 0.474 0.489 0.491 0.495 0.945 0.975 0.979 0.986 
c1956–1960 –0.514 22 0.470 0.490 0.497 0.502 0.914 0.954 0.968 0.977 
Incomplete 
secondary 
          
c1916–1920 a 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
c1931–1935 –0.242 21 0.234 0.239 0.240 0.242 0.967 0.987 0.991 0.998 
c1936–1940 –0.377 21 0.361 0.374 0.375 0.376 0.958 0.991 0.993 0.996 
c1941–1945 –0.475 21 0.452 0.468 0.469 0.471 0.952 0.985 0.988 0.992 
c1946–1950 –0.476 21 0.446 0.464 0.466 0.469 0.937 0.974 0.979 0.984 
c1951–1955 –0.445 21 0.408 0.426 0.430 0.435 0.918 0.958 0.967 0.977 
c1956–1960 –0.456 21 0.408 0.431 0.439 0.445 0.894 0.945 0.962 0.976 
Secondary comp. or 
higher 
          
c1916–1920 a 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
c1931–1935 –0.231 22 0.222 0.232 0.232 0.231 0.959 1.005 1.005 0.998 
c1936–1940 –0.381 23 0.370 0.388 0.389 0.386 0.971 1.018 1.021 1.014 
c1941–1945 –0.467 23 0.452 0.472 0.470 0.467 0.967 1.011 1.007 1.001 
c1946–1950 –0.420 23 0.391 0.414 0.416 0.416 0.931 0.986 0.990 0.989 
c1951–1955 –0.403 23 0.361 0.379 0.385 0.388 0.895 0.939 0.955 0.961 
c1956–1960 –0.436 23 0.370 0.407 0.417 0.419 0.849 0.934 0.957 0.961 
 
Note: a. Due to the small sample size, the 1921–1925 and 1926–1930 cohorts for the corresponding educational categories were 
integrated into the benchmark (the 1916–1920 cohort).  
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Table A-2: Marriage P&R process by level of education, 1916–1920 to 1956–1960 
birth cohorts, moving benchmark model 
Birth cohort Postpo
nement 
(P) 
Age  
at 
trough  
Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = R/P) 
30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
Incomplete 
primary 
           
c1916–1920 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921–1925 –0.049 18 0.048 0.049 0.050 0.050  0.980 0.994 1.017 1.026 
c1926–1930 –0.030 22 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029  0.924 0.961 0.994 0.966 
c1931–1935 –0.204 19 0.203 0.204 0.203 0.203  0.996 1.003 0.995 0.996 
c1936–1940 –0.141 19 0.139 0.139 0.140 0.139  0.983 0.982 0.993 0.983 
c1941–1945 –0.117 21 0.106 0.112 0.111 0.113  0.913 0.962 0.955 0.969 
c1946–1950 –0.034 23 0.010 0.022 0.028 0.028  0.309 0.639 0.836 0.839 
c1951–1955 –0.033 23 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.019  0.509 0.448 0.378 0.580 
c1956–1960 –0.105 25 0.054 0.060 0.071 0.074  0.512 0.567 0.677 0.699 
Primary 
completion 
           
c1916–1920 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921–1925 –0.057 19 0.064 0.060 0.057 0.057  1.117 1.047 0.995 0.995 
c1926–1930 –0.035 23 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.036  0.918 1.017 1.007 1.043 
c1931–1935 –0.224 20 0.225 0.223 0.224 0.223  1.005 0.995 1.001 0.996 
c1936–1940 –0.145 20 0.139 0.144 0.144 0.144  0.961 0.992 0.995 0.996 
c1941–1945 –0.117 22 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117  0.994 0.996 0.996 1.001 
c1946–1950 –0.029 22 0.015 0.021 0.024 0.026  0.514 0.706 0.829 0.897 
c1951–1955 –0.018 27 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.014  0.306 0.727 0.741 0.791 
c1956–1960 –0.018 29 0.002 0.007 0.012 0.013  0.091 0.390 0.667 0.721 
Incomplete 
secondary 
           
c1916–1920 a 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1931–1935 –0.242 21 0.234 0.239 0.240 0.242  0.967 0.987 0.991 0.998 
c1936–1940 –0.160 22 0.152 0.159 0.159 0.158  0.951 0.998 0.997 0.993 
c1941–1945 –0.136 23 0.129 0.132 0.132 0.133  0.948 0.974 0.977 0.982 
c1946–1950 –0.013 31 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.009  0.435 0.592 0.690 0.727 
c1951–1955 –0.008 33 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005  0.236 0.212 0.396 0.660 
c1956–1960 –0.016 28 0.005 0.010 0.014 0.016  0.279 0.624 0.849 0.942 
Secondary comp. 
or higher 
           
c1916–1920 a 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1931–1935 –0.231 22 0.222 0.232 0.232 0.231  0.959 1.005 1.005 0.998 
c1936–1940 –0.169 23 0.168 0.175 0.176 0.175  0.991 1.034 1.041 1.034 
c1941–1945 –0.089 24 0.085 0.088 0.085 0.084  0.953 0.981 0.948 0.945 
c1946–1950 –0.017 31 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.012  0.170 0.330 0.521 0.698 
c1951–1955 –0.019 32 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.008  0.285 0.008 0.262 0.419 
c1956–1960 –0.047 26 0.024 0.043 0.047 0.046  0.513 0.916 0.989 0.971 
 
Note: a. Due to small sample size, the 1921–1925 and 1926–1930 cohorts for c the corresponding educational categories were integrated 
into the benchmark (the 1916–1920 cohort).  
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Table A-3: Marriage P&R process by level of education, 1956–1960 to 1981–1985 
birth cohorts, fixed benchmark model 
Birth cohort Postponement 
(P) 
Age  
at 
trough 
Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = Rc/Pc)  
30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
Less than high school            
c1956–1960 0.000 13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.060 25 0.042 0.045 0.053 0.056  0.700 0.760 0.886 0.933 
c1966–1970 –0.114 26 0.017 0.052 0.077 0.093  0.150 0.457 0.680 0.815 
c1971–1975 –0.256 27 0.055 0.124 0.161   0.216 0.483 0.629  
c1976–1980 –0.377 27 0.078 0.201    0.207 0.533   
c1981–1985 –0.255 27 0.071     0.278    
High school 
graduation 
           
c1956–1960 0.000 13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.057 24 0.054 0.046 0.052 0.055  0.954 0.821 0.925 0.976 
c1966–1970 –0.043 29 0.003 0.012 0.025 0.032  0.059 0.283 0.588 0.759 
c1971–1975 –0.105 28 0.011 0.041 0.068   0.101 0.389 0.647  
c1976–1980 –0.234 28 0.041 0.119    0.175 0.507   
c1981–1985 –0.327 27 0.065     0.198    
Some college            
c1956–1960 0.000 13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.076 25 0.082 0.078 0.080 0.081  1.076 1.014 1.050 1.055 
c1966–1970 –0.067 24 0.024 0.034 0.047 0.048  0.366 0.513 0.711 0.726 
c1971–1975 –0.152 27 0.043 0.084 0.104   0.283 0.553 0.681  
c1976–1980 –0.289 27 0.064 0.185    0.222 0.640   
c1981–1985 –0.378 27 0.053     0.140    
Bachelor degree or 
higher 
           
c1956–1960 0.000 13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.080 25 0.097 0.082 0.084 0.085  1.214 1.032 1.055 1.064 
c1966–1970 –0.067 25 0.014 0.034 0.048 0.050  0.206 0.509 0.718 0.752 
c1971–1975 –0.227 27 0.053 0.121 0.163   0.231 0.534 0.716  
c1976–1980 –0.372 28 0.084 0.229    0.225 0.614   
c1981–1985 –0.482 28 0.109     0.227    
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Table A-4: Marriage P&R process by level of education, 1956–1960 to 1981–1985 
cohorts, relational model  
Birth cohort Postponement 
(P) 
Age at 
trough 
 Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = R/P)  
    30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
Less than high 
school 
            
c1956–1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.060 25  0.042 0.045 0.053 0.056  0.700 0.760 0.886 0.933 
c1966–1970 –0.081 28  0.002 0.033 0.051 0.064  0.025 0.413 0.633 0.789 
c1971–1975 –0.142 27  0.039 0.072 0.084   0.271 0.506 0.589  
c1976–1980 –0.127 28  0.028 0.083    0.224 0.655   
c1981–1985 –0.026 19  0.140     5.455    
High school 
graduation 
            
c1956–1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.057 24  0.054 0.046 0.052 0.055  0.954 0.821 0.925 0.976 
c1966–1970 –0.039 29  0.001 0.019 0.026 0.030  0.036 0.474 0.658 0.772 
c1971–1975 –0.070 27  0.016 0.037 0.051   0.230 0.525 0.724  
c1976–1980 –0.129 28  0.030 0.078    0.236 0.602   
c1981–1985 –0.094 27  0.025     0.264    
Some college             
c1956–1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.076 25  0.082 0.078 0.080 0.081  1.076 1.014 1.050 1.055 
c1966–1970 –0.048 29  0.000 0.015 0.025 0.026  0.008 0.307 0.524 0.536 
c1971–1975 –0.107 27  0.040 0.071 0.077   0.371 0.666 0.724  
c1976–1980 –0.140 28  0.025 0.104    0.179 0.744   
c1981–1985 –0.105 29  0.004     0.039    
Bachelor or higher             
c1956–1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961–1965 –0.080 25  0.097 0.082 0.084 0.085  1.214 1.032 1.055 1.064 
c1966–1970 –0.070 30  0.000 0.035 0.047 0.048  0.000 0.496 0.668 0.691 
c1971–1975 –0.169 27  0.047 0.096 0.123   0.279 0.566 0.729  
c1976–1980 –0.149 28  0.035 0.111    0.234 0.748   
c1981–1985 –0.109 28  0.026     0.235    
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